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HOW WELL DO WE TREAT EACH 
OTHER IN CONTRACT? 
ADITI BAGCHI? 
ABSTRACT 
 One of the important contributions of Nathan Oman’s new 
book is to draw focus onto the quality of the relationships enabled 
by contract. He claims that contract, by supporting markets, culti-
vates certain virtues; helps facilitate cooperation among people 
with diverse commitments; and produces the wealth that may fuel 
interpersonal and social justice. These claims are all plausible, 
though subject to individual challenge. However, there is an alter-
native story to tell about the kinds of relationships that arise from 
markets?i.e., a story about domination. The experience of domina-
tion is driven in part by the necessity, inequality, and competition 
enjoined by markets, and partly by the very structure of authority 
created by legally binding promise. Oman is right to look to mar-
kets for the normative character of contract but the ethics of con-
tract are more ambiguous than he allows. 
                                                                                                                        
? Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Nathan 
Oman for the opportunity to respond to his book in this forum. Although I was 
unable to attend the conference for banal reasons of weather, I am thrilled to 
participate in this substantive celebration of his achievement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Contracts are between two people.1 Philosophers of private 
law, including contract, make much of this fact.2 By contrast, le-
gal economists have long focused on the ways in which any given 
contractual relationship is the product of markets and how it, in 
turn, marginally shapes those markets going forward.3 Legal econ-
omists have understood contract law to be the rules of the market.4 
 Legal economists have been criticized for their apparent 
failure to take bilateralism seriously.5 In its bare form, this criti-
cism is not quite fair; economists have developed sophisticated ac-
counts of bilateral negotiations, both by way of formal models and 
game theory6 and cognitive psychology.7 But they do not take the 
bilateralism of legal adjudication of disputes arising out of contract 
                                                                                                                        
1 Contract, BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY (Steven H. 4th ed. 1996). 
2 See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 14–24 (2004) (examining the 
structure of contracts between two people, which often features one party with 
bargaining power and one without); see also JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE 
OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 18 
(2001); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 
457, 460–63 (2000). 
3 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 115–80 (8th ed. 2011). 
4 SMITH, supra note 2, at 43. 
5 See Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1248 
(1988) (observing that in the tort context, economic analysis views the relation-
ship between victim and tortfeasor as “tenuous and radically contingent”); see 
also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 
695, 702–09 (2003); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to 
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358 (2001) (describing the 
ad hoc character of legal economics explanations of property rules). But see 
Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: 
A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 
298–99 (2007) (arguing that economic analysis is consistent with the internal 
point of view). 
6 See, e.g., Marco Battaglini, Optimality and Renegotiation in Dynamic Con-
tracting, 60 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 213, 214 (2007); Paul Beaudry & Michel 
Poitevin, Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships, 61 ECO-
NOMETRICA 745 (1993); Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, Contract Renegotiation 
and Coasian Dynamics, 55 REV. ECON. STUD. 509, 511 (1988); Joel Sobel & Ichiro 
Takahashi, A Multistage Model of Bargaining, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 411 (1983). 
7 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Behavioral Economics and Contract Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 438, 442 (Eyal 
Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014). 
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to be an important feature of contract law,8 and they are relatively 
uninterested in the moral dimension of any bilateral relationship 
that results from contract.9 These are drawbacks to the legal eco-
nomic literature. 
 Philosophers of contract, by contrast, have had much to say 
about the bilateralism of contracts as well as private law adjudica-
tion.10 It is the starting point for more than one theory of contract.11 
However, our error tends to be the flip side of the one perpetuated 
by legal economists.12 Philosophers of contract have spent too much 
time thinking about the bilateral relationship in isolation, neglect-
ing that any given agreement is the byproduct of a market and is 
situated within broader market institutions.13 In his refreshing 
and astute new book,14 Nate Oman contends that the moral upshot 
of contract depends on the moral significance of markets.15 He is 
right. Some of us who have been concerned to connect the moral 
dots between individual contracts have focused on the demands 
of distributive justice.16 Few scholars, like Oman, have focused on 
the ethics of contract or its effect on character.17 Oman concen-
trates not on the moral demands that justice in the marketplace 
                                                                                                                        
8 NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2016) (addressing the lack of legal economists’ 
commentary on bilateralism’s effect on contract law). 
9 POSNER, supra note 3, at 117 (foregoing the moral repercussions that may 
occur within a bilateral contract as not relevant to the purpose of contract law). 
10 SMITH, supra note 2, at 56, 63–64. 
11 Id. at 55 (outlining various contract theories that rely on agreements be-
tween two parties). 
12 See OMAN, supra note 8, at 114–15 (arguing economists tend to be too 
silent about bilateralism’s role in contract); SMITH, supra note 2, at 63–64 (ad-
dressing that bilateralism of contracts is a consequence of consideration). 
13 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 63–64 (arguing bilateralism goes to under-
standing an agreement, but not addressing how contracts fit into the market 
system); see also OMAN, supra note 8, at 183. 
14 See generally OMAN, supra note 8. 
15 Id. at 1. 
16 See Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 193 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014) [herein-
after Bagchi, Justice and Contract]; Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and 
Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 105 (2008). 
17 See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 442 (examining how psychology affects 
decision making when entering contractual relationships, but not how contract 
affects character); see also POSNER, supra note 3, at 117 (arguing that the basic 
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places on individual contracts but on the ethical dynamics in contract 
that are fostered by markets.18 Along the lines of Adam Smith, he 
takes the effects of contract on character and civil society to be es-
sentially civilizing.19 And so he provides us with reasons to celebrate 
markets beyond the material wealth that they generate.20 
 In what follows, I will first summarize Oman’s claims, es-
pecially three propositions of primary concern here. First, Oman 
argues that the process of agreement-making and -keeping culti-
vates certain virtues in itself.21 Second, contract within markets 
is said to facilitate cooperation among diverse persons, and this 
enterprising contact with others is good.22 Finally, as the founda-
tion of markets, contracts generate wealth,23 and Oman contends 
that wealth makes it easier to cultivate certain virtues.24 There is 
some truth in each of these claims, and they are important, cor-
recting contributions to a literature that occasionally alludes to 
the ethics of contract as a framing matter, but rarely manages a 
sustained focus like the one Oman provides. Nevertheless, Part I 
also identifies grounds for caution with respect to each of the op-
timistic conclusions about the effects of the market on partici-
pants’ character, especially as it is relevant to sustaining a liberal 
democratic order.25 We face great empirical uncertainty about ex-
actly what kind of interactions contract inspires and whether these 
are as salutary as Oman suggests.26 My various doubts about 
Oman’s specific claims will lead us into Part II of this Essay, 
which raises a more general challenge.27 
                                                                                                                        
aim of contract law is to deter people from acting opportunistically, but not 
discussing the ethics of contracts). 
18 OMAN, supra note 8, at 15. 
19 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 18–21 (1776). 
20 See OMAN, supra note 8, at 13. 
21 Id. at 79. 
22 Id. at 43–44. 
23 Id. at 16. 
24 Id. at 63–66. 
25 See infra Part I. 
26 See OMAN, supra note 8, at 101, 172, 184 (discussing various interactions 
that contracts inspire). For a complete discussion of the uncertainties of the 
relationships Oman discusses, see infra Part I. 
27 See infra Part II. 
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 Part II will offer an alternative, rival picture of contract.28 
The more pessimistic narrative operates at two levels. First, be-
cause markets operate on a background of inequality, market re-
lationships are often sharply hierarchical, with one party at the 
mercy of the other.29 Even more important, people systematically 
experience the market differently over time, such that their innate 
sense of obligation or entitlement, control or chaos, varies depend-
ing on their material resources.30 The result is a political community 
within which there is a vast disparity in our experience of fellow 
citizens.31 The possibility that domination will centrally define 
civil relationships is perhaps even more evident when we consider 
the structure of individual contracts, which (for good reason) gives 
legal backing to the power some individuals exercise over others.32 
The experience of market domination does not optimally prepare 
either the dominant or the dominated for egalitarian politics.33 
I.  OMAN’S ACCOUNT OF THE VIRTUES FOSTERED BY CONTRACT 
 Oman does not purport to talk about the virtues emanating 
from contractual relationships as such.34 Because he is interested 
in contracts as the building blocks of markets,35 he talks about 
the virtues fostered by markets, or more specifically, by partici-
pation in markets.36 This is an interesting choice because many 
of Oman’s points could have been cast as claims about the ways 
in which contracting parties are altered directly—for the good—
by the practice of entering into arms-length commitments with 
non-intimates.37 
                                                                                                                        
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See id. 
33 Id. 
34 See OMAN, supra note 8, at 84 (arguing that contractual relationships foster 
virtues in society, but drawing a distinction between virtue in contract and 
virtue in markets). 
35 Id. at 18. 
36 See id. at 16, 56. 
37 See id. at 10–11. 
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 It is in fact quite difficult to tease apart the effects of agree-
ment, contract, and market participation.38 These distinctions mat-
ter not just to the question of where we assign credit, but what 
policy lessons we might draw.39 It might turn out that much of 
what we have to celebrate and worry about with respect to con-
tract is rooted in the institution of the market, and no tinkering 
with contract law on the margin will make a difference. In that 
case, our discussion of the ethics of contract is really about the 
choice to use it as an instrument of social organization, not the 
many smaller choices about how to shape the law of contract.40 
 Oman’s focus is not on these policy implications that sit on 
the margin.41 His priority is to defend contract and market as a 
bundle on the grounds of their contributions to the liberal demo-
cratic order to which his audience is categorically committed.42 
Regardless of whether contracts or markets are identified as the 
first fountain of virtue, Oman’s starting point is that liberalism is 
not self-sustaining.43 He does not anchor his argument in the in-
dependent good of virtue.44 That is, he does not argue that con-
tract law is valuable because it supports markets, which in turn 
foster virtue—period.45 Virtue standing alone would be too con-
troversial and illiberal an ultimate aim for private law.46 Instead, 
Oman argues that liberal democracy depends on markets to cre-
ate citizens, or at least, that the virtues fostered by participation 
in the market translate into better citizenship.47 This three-part 
link between citizenship, virtue, and markets generates an in-
strumental reason why the state should be interested in support-
ing markets that does not depend on the state engineering virtue 
for its own sake.48 
                                                                                                                        
38 See id. at 15–16. 
39 See id. at 16–17. 
40 See id. at 58, 68, 162. 
41 See id. at 162. 
42 See id. at 21. 
43 See id. at 43. 
44 See id. at 49. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. at 41–42. 
47 See id. at 49. 
48 See id. 
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 Even this instrumental take on virtue is controversial,49 
though, and understanding Oman’s argument requires under-
standing the entrenched views he implicitly rejects. No less than 
Immanuel Kant argued that it is possible to be a good citizen 
without being a good person, and indeed, it is the task of a state 
to create just relations among citizens even if they are a “nation 
of devils.”50 It is perhaps such thinking that has generally put lib-
erals at odds with the conservative emphasis on personal virtue.51 
But even Aristotle, perhaps the most esteemed philosopher of vir-
tue and one who believed that the state’s ultimate (and illiberal) 
aim should be to create good persons (and not just good citizens),52 
took the virtues relevant to citizenship to be of a different sort 
than those that make a good person.53 
Thus, some readers might depart from Oman at his very 
premises.54 One might disagree that personal virtue is relevant to 
law. In particular, one might disagree that any personal virtues 
fostered by markets are relevant to the liberal democratic project.55 
Liberal democracy does not necessarily require the people empa-
thize or consort with people different than themselves.56 It requires 
only that they “get along” in the minimal sense of maintaining 
peaceful relations under a state that directs them to right action.57 
 Oman does spend some time talking about the imperative 
of avoiding religious conflict,58 but his argument that liberal de-
mocracy requires private virtue seems to assume a higher standard 
for liberal democracy than avoiding civil war.59 He is right to aim 
                                                                                                                        
49 See infra text accompanying notes 51–54. 
50 Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in 
TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND 
HISTORY 90 (Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L. Colclasure trans., Yale University 
Press 2006). 
51 See OMAN, supra note 8, at 41, 77. 
52 See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 7 (R.F. Stalley ed., Ernest Barker trans., Oxford 
University Press 1998). 
53 See id. at 91–92. 
54 See infra text accompanying notes 56–58. 
55 See OMAN, supra note 8, at 43. 
56 See id. at 51. 
57 See id. at 47. 
58 See id. at 50–51. 
59 See id. at 49. 
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higher. John Rawls posited a “sense of justice” as an essential moral 
feature of persons.60 Without it, we do not have the will to support 
just social institutions;61 in a democracy, the state cannot create 
just relations among citizens without citizens creating a mandate 
for it to do so.62 Bare self-interest might be enough to motivate 
the laying down of arms but it will not motivate the redistributive 
welfare state.63 Are the kinds of civic virtues that Oman is con-
cerned to develop via the market the ones that would redeem the 
market by way of redistributive market-correcting policies? It is 
not clear that it would. The moral rhetoric of contract, with its 
emphasis on consent, assumed risks, and the boundaries between 
persons,64 might not lend itself to the solidaristic impulses, or the 
ethos of a common fate or shared responsibility, that tend to un-
derwrite the politics of welfare states.65 
 Oman is not very specific about the kinds of virtues that 
liberal democracy requires as a general matter,66 but the ones that 
he identifies as byproducts of markets are plausibly related to good 
citizenship in a liberal democratic regime.67 Philosophers like Peter 
Berkowitz have argued that liberals have underestimated the cen-
trality of virtue to implementing liberalism.68 It might be that habits 
of cooperation and open-mindedness need to be instilled by the 
state to get even the most minimal liberal order off the ground. 
 The state’s role in fostering virtue is uncomfortable terri-
tory for liberals and raises the hard questions about what virtues 
should make the official list.69 However, Oman may avoid much 
of the angst about the state exercising judgment on matters of the 
good because he does not call on the state to foster virtue directly, 
                                                                                                                        
60 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 495 (1971). 
61 See id. at 488. 
62 See id. at 492–93. 
63 See OMAN, supra note 8, at 80–81. 
64 See id. at 10–11. 
65 See Jacob S. Hacker, Bringing the Welfare State Back In: The Promise 
(and Perils) of the New Social Welfare History, 17 J. POL’Y HIST. 125, 151 (2005). 
66 See OMAN, supra note 8, at 43. 
67 See id. at 43–44, 46–49. 
68 PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM x–
xiv (1999). 
69 See OMAN, supra note 8, at 41. 
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or with any precision of target.70 The state’s role in his narrative 
is limited to supporting markets.71 If markets, which are inde-
pendently worthy of support given their role in producing material 
wealth,72 do the work of cultivating an amorphous set of neces-
sary virtues then the state itself does not have to pick and choose 
among virtues. 
 Although Oman does not describe in detail the kind of char-
acter that liberal democracy requires, he does elaborate several 
virtues that markets foster, which are among the presumably 
larger set that a just political order demands.73 First, Oman ar-
gues that the process of agreement-making and -keeping cultivates 
certain virtues.74 Second, contracting within markets is said to 
facilitate cooperation among diverse persons, and this enterpris-
ing contact with others nurtures good qualities.75 Finally, as the 
foundation of markets, contracts generate wealth, and Oman con-
tends that wealth makes it easier to cultivate certain virtues.76 
 The first set of virtues are ones most clearly rooted in the 
process of contract itself.77 People want things that others have or 
want others to do things for them.78 But in order to get what one 
wants through contract, one must induce her consent to trans-
fer.79 In teaching people to do this, Oman says that the market 
“disciplines and channels acquisitiveness.”80 Specifically, “[m]arkets 
require that one consider the point of view of others and alter one’s 
behavior to satisfy their desires.”81 These skills support the lib-
eral virtues of deliberation, or at least the consideration of oppos-
ing viewpoints (which seems to be only one aspect of deliberation), 
and weakens tribal loyalties and aristocratic attitudes.82 He argues 
                                                                                                                        
70 See id. at 184. 
71 Id. at 84. 
72 Id. at 101. 
73 Id. at 43. 
74 Id. at 43–44. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 41. 
78 Id. at 42. 
79 Id. at 43–44. 
80 Id. at 43. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 43–44. 
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that the “habits inculcated by well-functioning markets will make 
people adept in precisely the feats of imaginative understanding 
that liberalism requires.”83 In fact, Oman claims that exchange 
encourages “other-regardingness.”84 
 Oman is well aware that this is a surprising claim to make.85 
After all, markets are usually associated with the pursuit of 
self-interest.86 But Oman smartly distinguishes altruism from his 
idea of “other-regardingness,”87 which ends up sounding a lot like 
cognitive empathy.88 That is, markets do not necessarily make us 
want to promote the interests of others for their own sake.89 But 
they enable us to understand how others think and to understand 
what they want.90 Oman is completely right that this is an essen-
tial independent mental quality that may or may not accompany 
generosity.91 (In fact, one can imagine misguided altruists who lack 
this cognitive capacity and are ineffectual as a result.) 
 Oman points to the comparative results of the Ultimatum 
Game to evidence his psychological claims.92 He cites experiments 
that suggest that those in more market-based societies were more 
willing to share a windfall.93 Interestingly, this actually seems to 
go beyond “other-regardingness” in the sense that Oman describes.94 
Such behavior would meet the more demanding standards of a sense 
of justice, or maybe altruism after all.95 Of course, it is not possible 
to know that market participation is what engendered the positive 
behavior that Oman describes.96 As he himself observes, market 
societies are also likely to be less conflict-ridden (and therefore 
more socially cooperative) societies, politically functional, and less 
                                                                                                                        
83 Id. at 46. 
84 Id. at 44. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 45. 
87 Id. at 44. 
88 Id. at 83. 
89 Id. at 67. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 24. 
92 Id. at 45. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 44. 
95 But see id. at 44. 
96 But see id. at 45. 
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economically desperate.97 Any of these features, none of which is 
necessarily traceable to the market,98 could explain the willing-
ness of experiment participants to share their windfalls.99 It is not 
clear that market participation would habituate people to expect 
even division of a surplus, since the division of the transactional 
surplus in a bargain depends on underlying bargaining power.100 
Most contracts are made under conditions of unequal bargaining 
power,101 so people should be accustomed to lopsided divisions. 
Oman ultimately relies on our sharing his intuition that markets 
habituate people in the kinds of behaviors that would lead them 
to naturally hand over money to the other participant, against 
their own self-interest.102 
 Oman’s contention that markets breed a kind of “other-
regardingness” is related to another claim that is ultimately more 
compelling; that is, that market societies teach people to deal with 
people impersonally.103 Impersonal contacts in the market are im-
portant because “[a]lthough liberal orders need not be radically 
egalitarian, they do require at a bare minimum that formal dis-
tinctions based on class or caste be broken down sufficiently that 
their social power does not overwhelm liberal institutions.”104 
 In Oman’s account, dealing productively with strangers 
tends to have two kinds of effects.105 First, it erodes destructive 
conceptions of virtue: “[M]arkets ... tend to replace the ‘manly’ virtues 
of aristocracy with the more peaceable habits of tradespeople.”106 
This loaded claim depends, of course, on the idea that the aristoc-
racy really does have its own manly virtues (one wonders whether 
aristocratic women also aspire to those virtues, in Oman’s view?) 
and that those render aristocrats more prone to violence (or at 
least conflict) than commoners. Oman offers some dated anecdotal 
                                                                                                                        
97 Id. at 45. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 99. 
101 Id. at 135. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 44, 47. 
104 Id. at 47. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 48. 
2018]         HOW WELL DO WE TREAT EACH OTHER? 363 
evidence to back up this claim107 but it is inadequate to establish 
the sweeping proposition that the ideals of personhood that aris-
tocrats embraced were different from those that prevailed else-
where in the social hierarchy. Rival accounts might hold, for example, 
that a common moral code required different behaviors of aristo-
crats and tradespeople given disparate circumstances,108 or that 
aristocrats faced unique incentives,109 or one might even doubt 
the empirical contention that there was in fact more conflict among 
aristocrats than within other social groups.110 The claim that manly 
aristocratic virtues are at odds with market mores is confusing 
too because, though aristocrats were not out in the market square 
trading, they were involved in markets, broadly speaking.111 Aris-
tocratic women were probably far more removed from market par-
ticipation112 but Oman does not offer evidence to suggest that they 
were the group most prone to violence and internal conflict.113 
 Oman’s claim is still more dubious as applied to contempo-
rary societies.114 It is hard to imagine anyone entirely removed 
from the market in societies that are now so decidedly market-driven 
but it is not apparent that market participation ameliorates con-
flict or even violence.115 Indeed, the fiercest competition sometimes 
                                                                                                                        
107 See id. at 47–49. 
108 See id. at 44, 48–49. 
109 See id. at 44, 54. 
110 See id. at 47–49. 
111 See id. at 48; James F. Searing, Aristocrats, Slaves, and Peasants: Power 
and Dependency in the Wolof States, 21 INT’L J. AFR. HIST. STUD. 475, 478 
(1988) (describing how the Wolof nobility produced food crops in large-scale 
productive units). 
112 But see Anastasia B. Crosswhite, Women and Land: Aristocratic Owner-
ship of Property in Early Modern England, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1119, 1121–22 
(2002) (discussing how some elite women owned, controlled, and bequeathed 
significant amounts of property). 
113 See, e.g., Caroline Castiglione, Extravagant Pretensions: Aristocratic Family 
Conflicts, Emotion, and the ‘Public Sphere’ In Early Eighteenth-Century Rome, 
38 J. SOC. HIST., 685, 685 (2005) (telling the story of how a cardinal in the Roman 
Catholic Church successfully plotted to kidnap his niece). 
114 See infra text accompanying notes 116–18. 
115 See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, The Motive in a Manhattan 
Shooting? The Statue of Liberty, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes 
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leads to violence that seems almost anomalous and makes the rest 
of society look genteel in comparison.116 Think of the recent vio-
lence observed in connection with competition among Ellis Island 
ferry services.117 
 Although this reader was skeptical about Oman’s claim about 
market virtues as an alternative to aristocratic manly virtues,118 
I found compelling his more general claim that markets are a plat-
form for cooperation among people who are otherwise quite differ-
ent.119 Along these lines, Oman argues that “markets are a powerful 
alternative to politics for pursuing collective projects with those 
whom we might disagree violently with.”120 He elaborates that 
“[m]arket participants ... do not appeal to the passions, convictions, 
and deepest beliefs of those with whom they deal. ... In offering a 
means by which people cooperate with those whose beliefs they 
otherwise despise, markets provide powerful incentives to control 
the very forces that disturb the sleep of liberal theorists.”121 
 Oman’s account of the attitudes of “[t]hose who are socialized 
into the norms of a well-functioning market”122 is interesting for the 
potential it identifies. However, it is both theoretically uncertain 
and, unfortunately, it does not appear to describe the attitudes of 
contemporary Americans.123 He claims that properly socialized 
citizens will 
feel that there is something gauche about inquiring into the 
religious or moral beliefs of the supermarket cashier and refusing 
patronage on the basis of his or her answer. Likewise, people who 
habitually participate in the market are likely to find it entirely 
natural and unremarkable that they often buy and sell with those 
holding radically different conceptions of the ultimate good.124 
                                                                                                                        
.com/2017/05/28/nyregion/manhattan-statue-of-liberty-ticket-sellers.html [https:// 
perma.cc/W8HX-K5Q8]. 
116 See, e.g., id. 
117 See id. 
118 See OMAN, supra note 8, at 48–49. 
119 See id. at 54. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 58. 
123 See id. at 56–57. 
124 Id. at 58. 
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 But though people may regularly deal with people different 
from themselves in the market, it is not clear that the kind of in-
teractions that those dealings inspire are as salutary as Oman 
suggests.125 It might turn out that our contractual dealings with 
those of a similar demographic type are most likely to comport with 
Oman’s expectations with respect to contractual relationships gen-
erally, while many cross-group interactions reinforce rather than 
mollify perceptions of otherness.126 To the extent this is true, our 
experiences in contract are driven by our social identity with the 
result that those experiences actually reinforce social stratifica-
tion.127 Contract would not serve the expansionary purpose that 
Oman imputes to it.128 
 Moreover, though this reader shares Oman’s intuitions 
about “good” behavior on the market, one is left wondering how 
Oman reacts to the very real phenomenon of people preferring not 
to sell to people of a different race (though now required by law to 
do so)129 or people of a different sexual orientation (not yet clearly 
required by law to do so).130 These “conscientious objectors” to civil 
equality laws are tradespeople.131 Looking further back, we see that 
market societies have amassed colonies through which they sys-
tematically extracted wealth from other societies, using decidedly 
unpeaceable means.132 One wonders, is it market participation 
that drives people to the liberal premise of moral equality? Or, 
does a legal infrastructure of civil equality enable the market, by 
forcing open trade with people different from ourselves until we 
come to see them as not so different after all? Perhaps, it is politics 
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that sets the boundaries around the select people to whom market 
norms apply.133 
 Oman’s final account of how markets contribute to virtue 
might be the one that many people in wealthy, liberal democracies 
might suspect: money itself might make us good.134 The proposi-
tion sounds subversive, but is plausible: need can drive people to 
do things that they would otherwise deplore.135 The rich can be 
charitable.136 They can afford to abide by habits and principles to 
which others merely aspire.137 
 There are probably many respects in which this is just 
right. The crushing effects of poverty may exhaust the will and 
crowd out some lofty ambitions;138 financial anxiety can even com-
promise the pursuit of self-interest.139 But wealth, like most 
all-encompassing circumstances in which people of vastly differ-
ent moral composition find themselves, is surely ambiguous in its 
effect on character.140 For some, it is desirable as a means by 
which to pursue a variety of life projects,141 including ones that 
would qualify as “good” in the eyes of most others.142 But wealth 
is a less reliable means by which to promote goodness itself than 
Oman suggests.143 In some hands, it appears to breed greed, con-
tempt, a misplaced sense of superiority and entitlement.144 As 
was true of the other methods by which the market is argued to 
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promote good people and just politics, the truth is more mixed than 
Oman’s account would have us believe.145 The next Part raises a 
more general challenge to the happy picture he paints.146 
II.  CONTRACT AS DOMINATION 
 The previous section aimed to present Oman’s narrative of 
market-based virtue with some combination of sympathy and 
skepticism.147 This Part aims to offer a contrasting picture of the 
ethical world of markets.148 As was true of the more optimistic 
account studied above, it is hard to know which features of mar-
ket relationships are best understood as characteristic of markets 
as such and which are better attributed to the institution of con-
tract.149 Markets might have a general ethos that informs how 
individuals interact within its parameters150 or contract law might 
entrench certain expectations and thereby structure interper-
sonal relationships.151 I will not attempt to tease apart market 
and contract in this Part either, but only acknowledge that the 
implications of the narrative below might require some progress 
on that abandoned front. 
 The more worried narrative of market ethics starts with 
the fact that the great wealth generated by markets is distributed 
very unevenly.152 In advanced industrialized democracies, tax 
and transfer regimes and labor market interventions help dampen 
the socially stratifying work of markets153 but almost everywhere 
inequality is rampant.154 I am not claiming that markets produce 
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inequality, since pre-market societies were also vastly unequal.155 
My claim is the more limited and uncontroversial one that markets 
operate on vast inequality, whether it is properly regarded as in-
equality of its own making or not.156 
 Every market interaction is thus informed by the inequal-
ity in the background.157 This is not an overstatement but simply 
reflects the way markets work.158 People bring the resources they 
have to the market.159 Their ability to buy and sell—that is, what 
they sell and to whom on what terms—is all a function of the mar-
ket.160 The result is that the claims that individuals make on each 
other in a market society are driven fundamentally by their mar-
ketability.161 People who have more resources are entitled not just 
to more things against the world,162 but also, by virtue of the in-
dividual contracts they enter, they are entitled to different things 
from particular other people, including different services and prom-
ises of disparate quality.163 People are ethically marked by the 
market in that what they expect from others, what they come to 
believe they are owed by others, and what they come to accept 
that they owe others is all depend on their economic position.164 
 This ethical marking is problematic in itself—because nei-
ther exaggerated nor decimated self-esteem is admirable—but it 
also threatens to undermine the social bases for self-respect that 
is fundamental to liberal justice.165 It makes it almost impossible 
to achieve equality of opportunity over generations,166 another 
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precept of liberal justice.167 And vast disparities in resources and 
social status undermine the common understanding of moral equal-
ity among all persons that is the essence of democratic thinking.168 
 The insidious effects of the market can also be viewed at 
the ground level, through the window of individual contractual 
relationships.169 Those relationships are formally cooperative, but 
they often amount to a kind of domination.170 
 Promises are sometimes regarded as a kind of delegation 
of authority to promisees whereby the latter assume the power to 
either insist or release promisors from performance, though they 
had no such power before the promise was made.171 Autonomy-based 
theories of promise sometimes celebrate this delegation of author-
ity as a respectful relation, and perhaps a moment of self-discipline 
by promisors.172 But any delegation of authority in contract is driven 
primarily by necessity.173 Although promises in the marketplace 
are made to navigate society and amass the best one can have from 
what one begins with,174 this process is dispiriting for many who 
find that what they can have falls systematically short of what they 
want, or even what socially driven expectations have led them to 
believe they need.175 Thus, the exercise of the normative power of 
promise is not so happy an expression of normative power that the 
standard narrative in contract might lead us to think. While it is 
formally the case that one’s obligations in contract, including one’s 
obligations to a particular employer, are new upon contract for-
mation,176 the urgent need to find employment of one sort or another 
so constrains the choice to enter into any single offer of employment 
that it is misleading to describe one’s subsequent obligations to one’s 
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employer entirely of one’s own making.177 Similarly, though the ob-
ligations that firms might have to consumers might be formally gen-
erated by retail contracts,178 the relative position of consumers is 
more relevant to any one consumer’s experience as a retail promisee 
than the baseline that no particular firm owed that consumer any-
thing prior to contract.179 The ‘winning’ of a promise from a firm will 
not be compared by any consumer to the status quo whereby the 
firm owed that consumer nothing but instead to the kinds of commit-
ments other consumers in society have secured.180 And perhaps, be-
cause of the disproportionate impact of the wealthiest social groups 
on public consumer culture,181 the subjective experience of such 
comparison will often lead to perpetual disappointment.182 Market 
participation allows some people to express their preferences, even 
their identities, and to command the interest and attention of others; 
but brute necessity puts many consumers at the mercy of the mar-
ketplace.183 Their economic participation in civil society is not 
agency-enhancing in a phenomenological sense. 
 Importantly, the experience of contractual domination is 
not limited to the moment of formation, at which time the power 
exerted by one party over the other is not derived from any contract 
between them.184 Domination after contract formation is arguably 
more general—not limited to contracts between members of dis-
parate economic position—and it is sourced from contract itself.185 
 Many contracts are executed seamlessly and without re-
gret or even prolonged consideration of the contract itself.186 But 
many contracts are long-term contracts that impose either fixed 
obligations on a single party with dire consequences upon breach 
                                                                                                                        
177 See Bagchi, Unequal Promises, supra note 163, at 474–75. 
178 Id. at 480. 
179 Id. at 492. 
180 Id. at 493. 
181 Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trade-
marks to the Public Domain—With an Example from the Trademark Counter-
feiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1391, 1401 n.41 (1992). 
182 Bagchi, Unequal Promises, supra note 163, at 484–85. 
183 Id. at 490. 
184 Id. at 491–92. 
185 Id. at 468–69, 492. 
186 Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using 
“Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard 
Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 469–70 (2008). 
2018]         HOW WELL DO WE TREAT EACH OTHER? 371 
(e.g., mortgages)187 or confer a great deal of discretion on one party 
(e.g., employment).188 Some contracts do not have a power balance 
that would have been predictable at the time of contract formation, 
but circumstances evolve in unexpected ways to render the con-
tract an instrument of control from one side (e.g., supply contracts 
for an unstable supplier).189 
 For a myriad of good reasons, contract law does not attempt to 
balance out the power between contracting parties either at the mo-
ment of contract formation or over the course of contract perfor-
mance.190 Parties are free to extract the share of the transactional 
surplus that their market position makes possible, and beyond 
enforcing a duty of good faith performance, courts will enforce 
substantial and sometimes capricious exercises of discretion.191 
They will honor the strict controls that parties will subject them-
selves to at the hands of other parties.192 
 My aim here is not to denounce a contract law that puts 
people so much at the mercy of other private persons. There are 
changes we can make in the background, and even in contract law 
at the margin, that might ameliorate these problems.193 But by 
and large, these are inescapable consequences of the contract-market 
model,194 a model that—as Oman has eloquently demonstrated—
generates many benefits for society as well, including in the ethical 
realm.195 Nevertheless, just as Oman is right that we should ap-
preciate the work that markets do for us as persons and citizens,196 
we should periodically pause to contemplate how markets might 
erode the subjective experience of equality and freedom that lib-
eral democracy posits as our ideal.197 
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CONCLUSION 
 I do not doubt that contract contributes to the cultivation 
of certain virtues.198 But it might be ironic that Oman focuses on 
the ethical contributions of contract within markets.199 Because, 
in light of how markets function, it might be that contract ends 
up fostering quite a bit of vice as well.200 It is not possible to cash 
out these virtues and vices against one another,201 and in any 
event, assessing the impact of contract on character requires some 
kind of counterfactual against which to compare its work;202 we 
have no plausible counterfactual available.203 We are left, then, 
with an imperative to speculate as intelligently as possible as to 
the effects of specific contractual rules or practices on the margin, 
so that individual doctrines and perhaps, more importantly, indi-
vidual contracting practices can be tweaked accordingly.204 
 Oman has taken us several great strides in this direction.205 
More important even than the particular accounts of how markets 
might generate good or stabilize liberal democracy, is the shift in 
emphasis he ushers.206 Oman is right that markets breed virtues 
that enable liberal democratic politics,207 and he is also right to 
raise up the neglected link of private virtue between markets and 
politics.208 Politics depends on people,209 and we are made—indi-
vidually and as a collective—by the structures in which we encounter 
one another.210 For better or for worse, the marketplace is where 
the subjects of modern liberal democracies are forged.211 
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